S.L.Rubinstein and Phenomenology: A Japanese Perspective

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Introduction

My theme today is "S.L.Rubinstein and Phenomenology". You may wonder why a Japanese choose a topic such as this: a topic on something between a Russian psychologist on the one hand and a German origin philosophy on the other. From my own perspective, however, with my personal background, the topic is a very natural one. By way of my self-introduction, let me briefly explain the reasons why.

Does it sound strange to you if I say "Japan is a 'melting pot' of thoughts"? Various thoughts originating from the west as well as the east, have greatly influenced our Japanese culture. This is perhaps because of her geographical location and her long history of interactions with both the east and the west. These days, a tremendous number of works in all fields from all over the world have been translated into Japanese and have been published "like a flood", people say. Thus, sometimes Japanese intellectuals rather sardonically call the tradition of Japanese culture as a "translation culture", which means that its culture has been spoon fed with by the original thoughts imported from foreign cultures, including Indian, Chinese, Korean, Dutch, Russian, British, German, French, American and almost everywhere in the world. I may mention, for instance, that we have six different versions of translation of Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit", two of Husserl's "Ideen", two of Merleau-Ponty's "Phénoménologie de la perception", and even eighteen in all of K. Marx's "Das Kapital".

Under such cultural milieu and with its historical background, the psychology, especially the educational psychology, which is my major field of study—in Japan after the second World War has been under the strong influence of American mainstream psychology. Incidentally, before the War, it was exclusively under German influence. When I began to major educational psychology as a graduate student, I was enthusiastically trained in the "modern scientific" methods, such as statistical methods, experimental design, factor analysis, psychometrics, testing theory, scaling theory and the like. Later on I began to get seriously disillusioned with the "operationalism" and the neo-behaviorism for its inability to contribute realistically to educational practices and to substantiate their own epistemological foundation.

Just at that time, early 1960s, Dr. Kanji Hatano (1905~ ), who is my mentor in psychology and known in Japan as the introducer of Piagetian psychology in early 1930's, introduced me to Rubinstein's "Grundlagen der allgemeinen Psychologie" ("Foundations of general Psychology"), which looked to me at that time brightly shining to promise the future of the world psychology. Around that time, his other major works such as "Being and Consciousness" and "Principles and Way of Development of Psychology" were translated into Japanese. I began to get so deeply impressed by his works that I organized a group of my fellow psychologists, all young at that time, to study and translate together his "Foundations" book into Japanese, which was, after long years of our struggles, completed in 1986. In the meantime, I got familiar with Piagetian psychology, Cybernetics, General System Theory, Cognitive Psychology of some kind. From 1972 to 1982, I was involved with an educational movement with practicing teachers and cooperating educational researchers, organized by a Japanese master teacher, Mr. Kihaku Saito (1911~1981). The purpose of the movement was to study and create teaching practices of higher quality. Actively participating the movement and having familiarized myself with the concrete details of teaching experiences of advanced teachers, I had to reflect upon and eventually admit my own incapacity to go beyond the common sense to make any uniquely significant contribution to the creation of
practices better than the existing ones. This discovery was so shocking and depressing to me as a professional psychological researcher. I began modestly to explore and seek a more solid productive foundation upon which to build practices-and-researches of teaching. Around 1975, I came across the works of a phenomenological psychopathologist, Mrs. Mieko Kamiya (1914~1979), which opened up a new vista in front of me and introduced me to "Phenomenology", in which I have been increasingly involved to learn up until today. I had never imagined before that I would be involved in Phenomenology, which, I knew, was once so severely criticized by Rubinstein and which, I had believed, I could dispense with, nor had I imagined until recently that I would return to revisit Rubinstein, the Soviet psychologist advocating the dialectical materialistic psychology, which, as far as I know, most phenomenologists/phenomenological psychologists are perhaps attempting to ignore, ignoring and/or are ignorant of.

When Professor Steiner Kvale, who got to know something of my background, gave me the suggestion that I should make a presentation on "Rubinstein and Phenomenology" in this conference, I was at first a little surprised and then I was, in a way, encouraged to explore and reflect upon the meanings of my long years of wanderings. Finally, I was tempted to make an attempt to relate, through my own perspective, "Rubinstein and Phenomenology". So, this is, in a way, my sentimental nostalgic journey back to my home country with you, my friends, to introduce to you the best of my old friends. Is not it interesting that Rubinstein and Phenomenology encounter in a Japanese mind such as mine? This encounter could not have occurred if I were not born in Japan, a "melting pot" of thoughts imported from everywhere in the world, and if I were not given the kind of academic freedom as enjoyed in Japan today, which allows us to study freely, considering little of political and ideological implications, either phenomenology or dialectical materialism, or whatever. Some meanings of this freedom will be mentioned later.

So, in short, this is an attempt to introduce Rubinstein and Rubinsteinian Psychology to you, from a Japanese perspective, assuming that not many of you in English speaking world would be familiar with him and his works.

I. Sergei Leonidovitch Rubinstein (1889~1960)

[ Sergei Leonidowitsch Rubinstein (in German)]

I. 1. A Biographical Sketch

S.L. Rubinstein was born in Odessa on June 18th, 1889,

As you may have noticed, this year 1989 of our Aarhus conference happened to be his centennial year.

When he was young, he studied in Freiburg and Marburg in Germany. In 1913, he presented his doctoral dissertation "Eine Studie zum Problem der Methode" to the University of Marburg, for which he later received his doctorate in philosophy, and which was written under the direction of Herman Cohen and Paul Natorp, both neo-Kantian philosophers then in Marburg. This dissertation was published in Germany in 1914, which, incidentally, was translated into Japanese by Takezo Kaneko, a Hegelian philosopher, and was published in Japan:

[ルビンシュテイン著『絶対的理性主義』金子武蔵訳 岩波書店] in 1929.

Rubinstein studied Hegel, whose works were, you may recall, very much respected and studied by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Rubinstein's major interest was in the problem of methodology and in the problem of the relation between thought and being, both of which are considered as indicating the influence of his two mentors mentioned above.

I may mention also that Paul Natorp is known to have written, in 1914, partly out of his friendship to Husserl, a very favorable review on Husserl's "Ideen" [Paul Natorp: "Husserls Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie" Geisteswissenschaft, n.1, 1914.], from which fact perhaps we may be allowed to infer that Rubinstein could have been at least aware of the Husserl's work as early as 1914. Husserl is also known to have used a P.Natorp's book as a text in his course [cf. Trần Đức Thảo, 1971. p.82.].

May I also remind you that the First World War broke out in August 1914 and ended in
Rubinstein had been in Germany as a philosophy student for nearly six years from 1908 to 1914, namely in his youth between 19 to 25 years of age. We could easily imagine how much he must have become familiar with German language and with situations in German philosophy of that period. Around 1914, he returned to his home country as a homcomer, and then, a few years later, at the age of 28 or so, he witnessed the Russian Revolution and experienced the radical changes of the Russian society and culture. In other words, he had experienced the transitions 1) from Czar Russia to Germany, 2) from Germany to Czar Russia, 3) from Czar regime to Soviet regime, and 4) from Russian psychology and philosophy under the strong "idealistic" European influence to the birth and development of psychology and philosophy under/with Soviet "dialectical materialism". He published in 1934, at about the age of 45, his significant work: "Problems of Psychology in the Works of Karl Marx". In 1935, he published his first book "Foundations of Psychology".

On July 4th, 1936, the resolution (decree) by the central Communist Party "on the pedagogical distortions in the commissariats of education" was issued, which is said to have marked a turning point in the history of Soviet psychology and pedagogy. The political resolution severely criticized and banned the "bourgeois" psychologies —e.g. behaviorism and psychoanalysis—which were then popular in Soviet society, and also ostracized psychological testing which had been widely used in Soviet education until then. The influence of Western psychology and pedagogy was nearly wiped out, at least on the surface, so it is reported. Many psychologists and pedagogists were ostracized from the universities, so it is reported also. Rubinstein must have closely observed and experienced the effects and results of this political resolution (decree).

In 1940, the first edition of his "Foundations of General Psychology" was published and was awarded a Stalin prize in 1941, and its second edition was published in 1946. The book, critically incorporating much of Western psychology, became a classic in the Soviet psychology, having established and provided, is is said, the philosophical and theoretical foundations for Soviet psychology.

In 1950, the Pavlovian Conference was held, which is said to have been inspired by Stalin himself. "In the decade preceding the Pavlov Conference Rubinstein established himself as the foremost writer on Soviet psychological theory, and his views had been accepted as the most authoritative formulation of psychological theory in Soviet Union. After the Pavlov Conference of 1950 Rubinstein's formulation was no longer considered adequate and Rubinstein found it necessary to revise many of his ideas" (Payne, 1968, p.72.). He made even some self-criticism at the Conference. In other words, suddenly at the Conference, he lost his authoritative privileged position/status in Soviet psychology. Incidentally, his "Foundations" in Russian original had not been reprinted for many years since then, so I was told, perhaps over twenty years, thus was hard to obtain until a few years ago. He was just over the age of 60 at the time of the Conference. In 1957, he published his "Being and Consciousness", which was the product of his continued efforts since the 1950 Pavlovian Conference, to formulate a new philosophical and theoretical foundation for Soviet psychology. The book was adapted to the direction of the Conference toward integrating the Pavlovian physiology of higher nervous activity and the Marxism-Leninism philosophy. The book published in 1959: "Principles and Way to the Development Of Psychology" is in its nature a collection of his representative articles written in the whole course of his academic life, including the article on "K. Marx" in 1934 mentioned above, and one on Sechenov, a father of the modern Russian physiology.

He died on the 11th of January 1960, at the age of 70.

Considering the limitation of time, I have intentionally omitted the matters that will not specially concern us here and now.

At the moment, I would like call your attention to the following points.

1) Rubinstein was educated in Germany. Thus, he was familiar with the "idealistic" philosophy and psychology in the West, as well as, later, with the "materialistic" philosophy and
psychology in the Soviet Union.

2) Apparently, he was among the very few Soviet psychologists who had been following and catching up with the developments of philosophy and psychology in the West. When he published, however, his articles almost always took the form of criticism against the "idealistic" philosophy and psychology in the West and of proposing to construct and to establish the "dialectical materialistic" (Marxist-Leninist) psychology to overcome the idealistic tendencies in Soviet and World psychology.

3) He experienced in person the radical changes, academic as well as political, caused by the Revolution, i.e. the transition from Czar Russia to Soviet Russia, also the comparable changes, at least in the academic society, caused by and after the pedology resolution, and finally those by and after the Pavlovian Conference.

From these points indicated above, along with some other information I personally have, I cannot but get the impression that Rubinstein, in his later years, was personally lonely because he was not truly understood and accepted by those second generations who were educated monolithically only in dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union. Being and keeping up familiar with "idealistic" philosophy and psychology in the West, he seems to have always been in danger of getting critically attacked for his "idealistic tendency" and "Westernism". He knew too well, I believe, the meanings of attacks leveled against him, perhaps even better than the attackers themselves, and also he was fully aware of the possible political consequences of the attacks against him in the Soviet academic society. I will come back to these points later.

I. 2. His Works

At the end of the copy I have distributed, I have given the complete list of Rubinstein's works in Russian, and a list each of his works available in Japanese, in German, and in English, respectively. Even though the latter two are not complete at all, I hope they are of some help to you, nevertheless.

Obviously it is almost impossible to give even a glimpse of the whole works of Rubinstein. I would just attempt to give you a flavor of his works and will hasten to talk about his relation to Phenomenology.

Let me take up just two of his major works: "Foundations" and "Being and Consciousness".

"Foundations" is a very instructive book, to say the least. It is full of lively examples and illustrations taken from artistic and scientific works. For instance, Susan Isaacs records of children's lives are extensively used in the discussion of children's thinking. Many literary works are cited or many novelists are referred to, including Goethe, Keller, Gorky, Corneille, Thackeray, Shakespeare, Schiller, Dickens, Chekov, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Balzac, Flaubert, Poe, Pushkin. Racine, Rabelais, Rolland, which will show you the background of Rubinstein's understanding of man and at the same time the colorfulness and vividness of the image underlying the author's grasp of people. I recall a discussion on the creative working processes of Tolstoy's Anne Kacerina and Pushkin's "Gypsies", examining copies of their original handwritten manuscripts. Just, let me name a few more artists, included are musicians such as Cound, Cherubini, Schubert, Schumann, Chopin, Skryabin, Tchaikovsky, Hayden, Bach, Beethoven; and artists such as Giotto, Durer, Van Dyck, Michelangelo, Raffaello, Rembrandt, Rodin, and so on. This is just to communicate to you the lively everyday nature of the materials disscussed in the book. You may compare the book to William James's "Principles of Psychology", which is also referred to many times in the book, though mostly rather critically.

The book is composed of the following chapters: The object of psychology, Methods of psychology, The history of psychology: both European and Russian, The problem of development in psychology, The behavior of animals and the development of the psyche, The human consciousness, Sensation and perception, Memory, Imagination, Thinking, Linguistic Act, Attention, Emotion, Will, Activity, Intentionality of personality, Talent, Temperament and character, Self-consciousness of man and his way of life. The organization of the book may look somewhat old fashioned to you,
perhaps, but the discussions in it are very quite extensive and detailed, attempting, in
principle, to critically examine the researches and psychological theories in the West to
incorporate and organize into a dialectical materialistic system of psychology.

The book is not only rich, lively and well-organized, but also very much principled: in
fact we may say that Rubinstein made explicit the system of Soviet psychology in the
"Foundations". The fundamental principles are formulated by Rubinstein in the five theses as
follows:

"a) The principle of the unity of the psycho-physical unity. This includes the unity of the
psychic not only with the organic substrate, whose function the psychic is, but also with the
object, which reflects itself in the psychic. b) the principle of the development of the Psyche as
a derivative but specific component in the evolution of organisms, in which process, through the
adaptive changes of living-style, not only the structure of the nervous system but also the
psycho-physical functions (in their unity and interrelation) changed. c) the historical principle,
which relates to the development of human consciousness in the process of the social-historical
development, in which process the social being of men determines his consciousness and his living-
style and the thoughts and feelings that are conditioned by these consciousness and living-style.
d) the principle of the unity of theory and practice, that is to say, the unity of the theoretical
and experimental study of human psyche and the working on the psyche. These are the Fundamental
Principles of Soviet Psychology. ..... The threads which come out of these principles are united
in a knotting point-- e) the thesis of the unity of consciousness and activity." (Rubinstein,

We cannot stay too long with the first book.

The second book "Being and consciousness" is subtitled as "The position of the psychic
in the universal interrelationship of phenomena in the material world". The title and sub-title
together indicate that the main theme of this book is to clarify the nature of the psychic in the
material world, in which phenomena are universally interrelated. The book is considered as to
provide the foundation for the construction of the dialectical materialistic psychology. The
relationship of the psychic to the material world is conceived in its two aspects: on the one
hand, the psychic is the functions of the brain, its higher nervous activities, and on the other
hand, it is the reflection [отражение; Widerspiegelung; 反映] of the world. In much
closer terms, the psychic is related to the material world two-fold, first, as the
function of the "material" brain, and second, as the reflection of the "material" world. Much
space is allotted to the clarification of the first aspect, the relation between the psychological
activity and the brain. This is done not just on the basis of general physiological terms and
brain physiology, but on the more specific basis of Pavlovian physiology of higher nervous
activity. As you may recall, this book was written as a reply to the severe criticisms directed
against him on the occasion of Pavlovian Conference in 1950. The charges at that time was mainly
on two points, first on his "Westerism", i.e. the lack or insufficiency of his criticism against
western psychologies, and second, on the insufficiency of his incorporation into his system of
Pavlovian physiology of higher nervous activity. As his reply to these criticism, his attempts to
remedy his old ideas seems to center around these two points.

I believe those who have not seen the criticisms in the originals themselves will have a
difficulty imagining how harsh and violent they are and how "stereotypic", at least from my point
of view, they are. So, let me introduce a few paragraphs of the criticisms:

E.T. Chernakov, in his "Rubinstein critique", after criticising Rubinstein for "his
imitation of [William] James", his departure from Marxism, his closeness to Schopenhauer and Freud" and to K.Lewin, writes on "the bankruptcy of Prof. Rubinstein's conception", and also writes that
"we find echoes of the idealist bourgeois psychologists of various schools and trends, who in
their desire to serve the imperialist policies of their masters excel in their attempts to prove
the dominance of the instinctual, the unconscious, over the conscious; ..." and so on. In
conclusion, he writes: "The fact that Prof. Rubinstein in a number of basic problems drifts away
from dialectical materialism, dooms his psychology to a complete separation from Soviet reality.
and renders it useless. Rubinstein's psychology is an example of abstract science, science that lacks party-partisanship, science or science's sake. It can become truly scientific only if it takes a decisive turn towards Soviet man in our Soviet reality, only if it resolutely and consistently assumes the position of dialectical materialism, which is only possible on the basis of a radical repudiation and consistent struggle against all schools and theories of bourgeois idealist psychology" (Cheornakov, 1950, p.285: original 1948.)

Another critique by Kolbanovskii sounds to me more serious, because it is not just a personal opinion but a sort of report based upon criticisms raised in a conference in which more than 19 identified major psychologists participated. Again the criticism is severe, to say the least, first pointing out Rubinstein's incorrect objectivist position and academic detachment in his examination of the history of psychology, his lack of partisanship, lack of attempt to criticize. "He does not criticize the reactionary conceptions of the modern bourgeois psychologist" was the criticism against Rubinstein. And even when he does criticize, he is criticized by being pointed out "that S.L.Rubinstein's criticism is abstract, and that bourgeois psychologists themselves could apply this type of criticism to each other" (Kokvanovskii, 1950, p.287: Original 1947). "It would seem that a Soviet psychologist would find it imperative to attack all these reactionary unscientific schools of psychology and subject them to the annihilating fire of his criticism. But S.L.Rubinstein did not do that. Moreover in a number of cases he himself followed the line of bourgeois psychologists when he tried to discover in their teachings a 'rational core'. The majority of the author's mistakes are to be found in his description of consciousness (there is evidence of the fact that he borrowed from Cohen, the follower of neokantianism), in the special problems of the study of thinking (influence of the idealist Würzburg school) and in his study of personality (influence of Kurt Lewin's school of dynamic psychology). These mistakes illustrate S.L.Rubinstein's uncritical approach to bourgeois psychology"(ibid. 289). The critic advises to "cast aside the reactionary rubbish of traditional idealist psychology"(ibid.) and to follow the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Pavlov, and the "giants" progressive thinkers of 19th century Russia. In conclusion he writes: "These are the major faults of S.L.Rubinstein's book: The absence of partisanship; the uncritical and at times servile attitude toward foreign theories of psychology; the gross mistakes and deviations from Marxism; the vagueness of style—all of these make it impossible to claim that this book is representative of the Soviet system of scientific psychology" (ibid. p. 294): (Emphasis all by Yoshida).

These were the atmosphere that had preceded the Pavlovian Conference, in which Rubinstein was criticised and which had then great political implications comparable to the 1936 Decree of Pedology. Under these circumstances, I would regard it quite natural that Rubinstein became much more careful later in citing foreign "bourgeois" psychologists and philosophers and, whenever he cites, he criticizes them severely.

Obviously, I cannot go into the details of the book. Let me just cite two paragraphs which shows the basic principles around which the book is organized.

"Just as all other phenomena, the psychic phenomena are also related/connected with all other phenomena of life, all sides and characteristics of material world. Into its different relationships appear the psychic phenomena in distinctive qualities: sometimes as reflective higher nervous activity, sometimes as the ideal in opposition to the material, or as the subjective in opposition to the objective. In order to reveal the nature of the psychic all-sidedly and rightly, we may not begin from one abstract-universal concept of the psychic, which, from the beginning, fixes the psychic one-sidedly in one characteristic/quality and in which the psychic appears only in a definite relation (e.g., as the ideal in opposition to the material or as the subjective in opposition to the objective). We must study the psychic phenomenon concretely, must observe it in all essential interrelations and mediations, must clarify its various characteristics, which must be brought in harmony with the objective logic of connections and relations in which each of these characteristics appears. This is the starting point of a really scientific investigation, which can overcome the various and, in their one-sidedness,
arbitrary "standpoints". (Rubinstein, 1973, s.2: 1960, p.14) "Psychic phenomenon is the activity of the brain and simultaneously reflection, cognition of the world" (ibid.).

At the last, I must not miss to refer to the principle of the determinism understood by dialectical materialism. "The determinism, in the dialectical materialistic sense, regards every action as interaction. The effect of every external action depend not only on the body, from which the action comes out, but also on the body, which is exposed to this action. The external causes act through the internal conditions, ( which are being formed depending upon the external actions). (Ibid. s. 8.: Ibid. p. 21-22.) "All phenomena of the world interrelate with each other. Every action is interaction, each change of a phenomenon reflects itself in all other phenomena and this change itself is a response to the changes of other phenomena, which have acted upon it. Every external action is, through the internal characteristics of the phenomenon 'refracted', which is exposed to this action. Every interaction is in this sense reflection of a phenomenon through the others. It was not without reason that Lenin wrote: 'It is logical to assume that the whole of matter possesses a property essentially similar to sensation, namely the property of reflection'" (Ibid. s.9: p. 22-23). Incidentally, the last quotation of Lenin is considered as the basic proposition to Soviet psychology and has been quoted countless times and has initiated endless polemics, so it is reported (Levy Rahmani, 1973, p. 64.).

The book published around the age of 68, only three years before his death, was a response to the criticisms at the Pavlovian Conference. The book incorporated the Pavlovian physiology of higher nervous activity and made severe criticisms against idealistic Psychology and Philosophy, as if to demonstrate his fatigueless self-criticism and his rebirth of partisanship. Let me stop my brief introduction of Rubinstein's works here.

III. Some Issues for Encounter

Let us enter the theme of the relationship of Rubinstein's Psychology to phenomenology. What is phenomenology? This is not an easy question I can tackle now. I just refer you to the preface of Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception". Just let me tell you proudly that I am wise enough to admit my ignorance about what Phenomenology is. Besides, if I begin to lecture you on what Phenomenology is, it would be very much like preaching Buddhism in front of many Buddhas, I am afraid. I would limit myself talking on what Rubinstein wrote about Phenomenology, and on the relations of his ideas—or ideas of dialectical materialism of his kind—, perceived by myself as relevant, possibly interesting to Phenomenology, or, at least, to some of you, .

III.1. Rubinstein's Criticism on Phenomenology

In his "Foundations", Rubinstein had already mentioned to the works of scholars such as Dilthey, Brentano, Husserl, F.J.J. Bytendijk, K. Jaspers, J.J. von Uexküll, K. Lewin, Rubin, as well as S. Freud, Hegel, Bergson, Ehrenfels, G.W. Allport, Cranit, Külpe, W. Köhler, K. Koffka, K. Goldstein, P. Janet, C. Stumpf, O. Selz, K. Duncker, E. C. Tolman, J. Piaget, K. Bühlery, but did not discuss Phenomenology as such. He did not criticize Phenomenology as such, but in general, he mentioned to phenomenological authors in an "academic detachment" to encourage readers to learn their "rational core".

In his 1957 "Being and Consciousness", he gives a few very critical comments on Phenomenology and phenomenologists, as if to demonstrate his clear materialistic partisanship against idealism. Just, to give its flavor, let me offer you a few examples.

Rubinstein wrote that "Consciousness always presupposes an epistemological [cognitive] relationship to[with] the object, which exists outside the consciousness" (Rubinstein, 1973 s.295; 1960, p.372.: Emphasis Rubinstein's; Translation mine from German and Japanese). Then, in the footnote, he wrote as follows: "With the definition of the consciousness as 'Intention' (as Directedness), E. Husserl submit a thesis which, as it were, formally agrees with ours [i.e. the thesis cited above]. However, in his explanation [explication], he in fact repudiates the thesis and turned it up side down and changed it into its opposite. The first premise of the
philosophical(phenomenological) approach to the problem of the relation between consciousness and being, in distinction to empirical(psychological) approach, consists, according to Husserl, in that the world be 'put into bracket'. With this, the question of the reality drops off, and only the question of the 'essence' remains. As soon as this occurs, the world for the consciousness becomes the meaning [of the] 'world', that is something assumed [hypothesized] by the consciousness./ The idealistic conception appears much more conspicuously in later years of Husserl..." We may notice that, in Soviet writings, when someone is called as idealistic, it almost usually meant that someone is wrong, false, incorrect and dangerous. So, here, what Rubinstein is saying amounts to saying that Husserl is idealistic, wrong and dangerous. When I was young, being enthusiastic about Rubinstein and reading these kind of criticisms, I "stupidly" believed that I can dispense with Husserl, which, I believed, would save me a lot of time. Today in Moscow, I was told, there are practically none even among Rubinsteinian students who are seriously studying phenomenologists.

In addition to Husserl, Rubinstein critically discusses Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger. On Merleau-Ponty, Rubinstein wrote that he "attempted to hide the idealistic point of Husserl's conception and, by so doing, to maintain it covered up (See the programmatic preface to "Phenomenology of Perception".) (ibid.)."

Rubinstein wrote the word of suggestion "See", i.e. he suggested that the readers may better see it in person, which is quite noteworthy, because by so doing, he is, in a way and in a sense, attempting to reserve opportunities for wide audience in Soviet Russia to have direct contact with the "idealistic" phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty.

In short, in Rubinstein's book, it is written, rather stereotypically, that all phenomenologists are evidently more or less "idealistic", therefore, they are not worth any serious study, so his messages seemed to sound.

III.2. "Reflection" and "Intentionality"

As we have seen, "Reflection" is the central concept in Rubinsteinian Dialectical Materialism, whereas "Intentionality" is the one in Husserlian Phenomenology and the phenomenology in general. As Rubinstein himself noticed, the formulation of "Intentionality" by Husserl sounds almost like the one of "Reflectoin" by Rubinstein, at least on the surface, or "formally".

Rubinstein wrote in the very beginning section of the "Foundations" :"If the belongingness to an individual, to a subject is the first essential characteristic of the psychic, then, its relation to an object which is independent from the psychic, from the consciousness of the object, is its another and no less essential feature of the psychic. Every psychic phenomenon is differentiated from all other phenomena and is determined as such and such a lived experience by the fact that it is the lived experience of something; the internal nature of the psychic phenomenon is expressed through its relation to the external. The psychic, the consciousness, reflects objective reality, existing outside and being independent of it; consciousness, is being having become conscious." (1946, p. 5. in the Russian original: 1959, s.17.: 1981, p.16). The last sentence in German is "Das Bewusstsein ist bebußtgewordenes Sein". To quote Payne's succinct summary: "Every experience is related to some object; it is always an experience of something. Accordingly it supasses the limits of the inner world. Moreover, according to Rubinstein, to become conscious of an experience means to relate it to the object which called it forth. One experience is distinguished from another by its object. . . . Consciousness is not a turning inward on our own subjective states but a turning outwards towards the outer world by relating our inner states to the objects which called them forth. Consciousness is a "unity of experience and knowledge" of inner and outer. It is determined by the object it reflects." (Payne, 1968, p. 86-87.).

I recall van den Berg's distinction between Dilthey-Jaspers type phenomenology and Husserl-Binswanger type phenomenology. What Rubinstein suggests is that he would side with Husserl-Binswanger, to put it in an extremely simplified way.

"We understood under 'Intentionality' the unique peculiarity of experiences 'to be the
consciousness of something.' It was in the explicit cogito that we first came across this wonderful property to which all metaphysical enigmas and riddles of the theoretical reason lead us eventually back; judging, the judging of a certain matter; valuation, the valuing of a value; wish, the wish for the content wished, and so on." This is a passage from Husserl's "Ideas" (p. 223).

You may, at least, feel already a very much of proximity here. Of course, I would not be so courageous, adventurous or brute as to say that "Reflection" is the same as "Intentionality". However, we should not be satisfied with making a stupid strawman out of the Dialectical Materialist such as Rubinstein. On the one hand, sometimes people unfamiliar with it get the impression that the word "Reflection" implies too passive a mode and say that the human consciousness must be regarded as much more active. Agreed. However, the word "Reflection" does not mean passivity, the activity of consciousness is sufficiently well recognized by Rubinstein. On the other hand, sometimes the word "Intentionality", to some people, suggests the active character of consciousness but not the passive one. Again, however, the "passive synthesis" as well as "active synthesis" is extensively discussed by Husserl himself, I was told. This is not the issue at all, but the issue is to remedy the misunderstanding out of ignorance.

Rubinstein wrote on the active character of scientific cognition along with its reflective character, as follows:

"On the basis of the conception, which is so widely spread among the epistemological theories of foreign countries, that the scientific cognition constructs the reality, there lies the correct thought that the cognition is an activity of the subject. However, this correct thesis is distorted by the false contraposition of the cognitive activity of the subject to the objective being. Exactly by this dualistic contrast, the result of the subject's activity is falsely regarded as the construction of being. Nevertheless, in reality, in the result is the more or less adequate, more or less deep reflection of being. The supporters of the theory of scientific cognition as construction of reality prove, when they defend this conception, usually with the first correct thesis that the cognition of the being is the result of the activity of the subject. The complementary premise—the above-cited dualistic contraposition of the results of the subject's cognitive activity and of the objective being—remains in the background. However, exactly that is the cause for the false concluding conception. Without the second presupposition, the first presupposition can not defend the whole conception. When one criticize this, one must separate both of these presuppositions apart, agree with the first, while showing the groundlessness of the second, also betray the groundlessness of the concluding thesis."

(Rubinstein, 1973, s.104-105:1960, p.138-139.)

I do not think I need to refer to the phenomenology's dictum "Zu den Sachen selbst" here.

What I would like to point out is that there is a point of encounter here, from which perhaps both had departed apart, as materialism and idealism respectively. However, the discoveries made by each so far can and may complementarily help each other and will make up the better picture as a whole, which may not be possible only through either one of them in isolation.

What I suggest is that 1) Phenomenology, as far as I have learned so and understood so far, is not so simple-mindedly and utterly wrong as some of Russian colleagues had suggested or seem to have suggested, but, at the same time, 2) Dialectical Materialism, at least of Rubinsteinian one, is not so simple-mindedly and utterly wrong as some phenomenologists may believe. I found they both are "intelligent", not "stupid",—--I will come up with the meanings of these words shortly,—-- truely exciting and serious projects. I would rather be happy to see both sides study each other to genuinely and sincerely encounter and to find out the points of their common interests to enrich each other, both and all.

III.3. Other Possible Points of Encounter

[I am afraid I am losing time now. Let me finish quick.]
Naturally, there are many issues of possible encounters between Rubinstein and Phenomenology. Let me just enumerate some of them:
1) "Natural Experiment" and Everyday Life-World
2) Imagination as "Reflection" and Imaginative Variation
3) The Meaning of the "Crisis" of the Psychological Science.
4) Richness of Perception and Phenomenology of Perception
5) The Role of Language in Experience
6) "Matter" with reflective nature and "Flesh" as a "general thing"
7) The Problem of "I and the World"
8) Shared Criticisms against Introspectionism and Behaviorism
9) The Method of Auxiliary Problems

and so on, and so on.

Regrettably, I have lost time now for writing a manuscript to my presentation around these issues, it seems that I have to wait my next opportunity for my presentation.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, I myself can not believe, regrettably, that I have succeeded to explicate and communicate the relationship between Rubinstein and Phenomenology, which turned out to be such a difficult task. However, I hope, at least, I have communicated to you my message that Rubinstein is worth a serious study for a phenomenologist, since there are many spots of possible encounters, even though it looks as if he only severely criticizes Phenomenology and regards Phenomenology an "idealistic reactionary 'rubbish'."

I would rather situate his criticisms against Phenomenology in the social and academic situation he was in after the experiences of the decree of pedology and of Pavlovian Conference. He had no other way than to criticize severely, in order to mention foreign scholars, idealistic phenomenologists in particular. Why did he mention them at all? He could have avoided to mention them and totally ignore them, if they are truely "rubbish", of course. Why did not he ignore them? Why did he even discuss them at all? Why did he criticize them so severely? Why did he give even the detailed references? Why did he indicate that he had read these authors? Why are there similarities between Rubinstein and these authors, in spite of his severe criticisms? Could he have changed so radically after 60 years old? Was it a lip service? Why has it been an issue whether or not it was a lip service, among historians? The fact still remains that he studied Phenomenology, apparently and perhaps, for the purpose of publishing criticisms. Would it be too wild if I infer that he had wished to publicize the very existence of these phenomenological thinkers, from whom he learned so much but upon whom he was not allowed to imply that he had attempted to discover in their teachings a "rational core", which, I believe, he had successfully discovered and incorporated into his system quietly. He wished perhaps, let me be so wild as to infer, that the younger generations of Soviet psychology in Russia would follow after his path of criticisms to go back to the originals of Husserl and other phenomenologists he once had studied carefully and that they should perhaps find these originals interesting and instructive, eventually to use them to enrich the Soviet psychology, which was provincial still but should not remain so for too long. Or was it his intention to keep the possibility that the foreign scholars will find the points of encounter with him and the Soviet psychology through his works.

Lenin once wrote that: "Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent, metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of stupid." (V.I. Lenin Collected Works. Volume 38. Philosophical Notebooks. Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow 1961. p. 276.) Perhaps, Rubinstein was very well aware of the truth of Lenin's words. From our perspective of phenomenology, we may paraphrase this as "Intelligent materialism is closer to intelligent idealism than stupid idealism", if our phenomenology is ever the so-called "idealism".

My message then is that Rubinstein's is an intelligent materialism, which will be worth to be encountered sometime.
A happy encounter between Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism could have occurred neither in Soviet Russia of 1950's nor in the U.S. under MacArthyism, for instance. I happen to be born in Japan, the melting pots of thoughts, to get to know both and to find the possibility that both could help each other even though they both seem at present to be unaware of any such possibility. I discovered some works of Tran Duc Thao, a north Vietnam philosopher, who once worked with Merleau-Ponty, had attempted to show the way to go from Husserlian Phenomenology to Marxism. As you may know, he wrote a book "Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism" (1951, in French), which had been translated into Japanese in 1971. I am very much awaken through my sentimental journey back to Rubinstein to feel his yet unnoticed proximity to the later Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, A. Schutz, which I have been struggling to understand to contribute to my Educational Psychology. At present, these remarks of mine may not please anyone at all, but if a time comes when we get emancipated from political and social implications of theoretical and philosophical foundations of psychology, then many might join me to appreciate and to explore the possibility of mediating, integrating and synthesizing various serious efforts so far made, in separation or in isolation, in U.S. and in Soviet, or in Europe, east or west, and in Asia or elsewhere, to build up the World Psychology, or the Human Science, for the peace and welfare of people all over the world. This is just a tiny little beginning for me, perhaps as well as for you.

Thank you.

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